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ABSTRACT. The settling of comprehensive land claims across Canada’s territorial North has brought about substantial
changes in governance. Prominent among these has been the establishment of numerous regulatory and co-management
boards dealing with land, wildlife, and environmental issues. These boards were explicitly designed to bring significant
aboriginal influence to bear in key land and wildlife decisions. To examine whether the boards have enhanced aboriginal
participation and influence in these decision-making processes, factors such as the number and influence of aboriginal board
members, the extent of board powers, the independence (financial and otherwise) of the boards, and the boards’ willingness
and capacity to incorporate traditional knowledge into their operations are considered. Overall, the evidence supports the
conclusion that the land-claim boards represent an important vehicle for substantially enhanced aboriginal involvement in
and influence over government decisions affecting the wildlife and environment of traditional aboriginal lands.
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RÉSUMÉ. Le règlement d’importantes revendications territoriales dans les territoires canadiens du Nord s’est traduit par
des changements considérables en matière de gouvernance. L’un de ces changements les plus importants a consisté en
l’établissement de nombreux conseils de réglementation et de cogestion s’occupant de questions ayant trait aux terres, à la
faune et à l’environnement. Ces conseils ont été explicitement conçus pour que les Autochtones exercent une plus grande
influence sur les décisions relatives aux terres et à la faune. Afin d’examiner si ces conseils ont permis d’améliorer la
participation des Autochtones et de rehausser l’influence qu’ils ont sur la prise de décisions, divers facteurs tels que le
nombre et l’influence des membres autochtones aux conseils, l’étendue des pouvoirs des conseils, l’autonomie (financière
ou autre) de même que la volonté et la capacité des conseils à intégrer les connaissances traditionnelles à leur exploitation
entrent en ligne de compte. Dans l’ensemble, bien des éléments portent à croire que les conseils découlant des revendications
territoriales représentent un important véhicule menant à une participation et à une influence autochtones substantiellement
accrues à l’égard des décisions gouvernementales concernant la faune et l’environnement des terres autochtones traditionnelles.
Mots clés : autochtone, revendications territoriales, co-gestion, réglementation environnementale, conseils
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INTRODUCTION
Politicians with unpopular records in office, when facing
re-election, have been known to implore cranky voters to
“compare me with the alternative, not the Almighty.”
However well such an appeal works as an electoral tactic,
it has much to recommend it as a principle for evaluating
northern land-claim boards. The various regulatory and
co-management boards established under Canada’s north-
ern comprehensive land claims clearly represent a major
departure in governance, premised as they are on enhanc-
ing aboriginal participation in key land and wildlife deci-
sions. But are these new arrangements significant advances
for the aboriginal peoples of the North, according them
unprecedented influence over issues central to their liveli-
hood and cultural well-being? Or is it the case that, in the
words of one critic, “it would be difficult to conceive a
more insidious form of cultural assimilation than
co-management as currently practiced in northern Canada”
(Stevenson, 2004:68)?
This paper evaluates these distinctive institutions that
have become so central to a wide range of important policy
processes in the North. The evaluation is limited to govern-
ance issues, especially the role and influence of aboriginal
people in decision-making processes, and does not attempt
to determine the appropriateness or the effectiveness of
decisions and policies relating to environmental protection
or wildlife management. Its empirical base encompasses
only boards operating in the territorial North and thus does
not consider either the various institutions established up to
three decades ago under the James Bay and Northern Que-
bec Agreement or the boards emerging from the much more
recent Labrador Inuit Association claim.
I argue that overall, the land-claim boards constitute a
signal improvement for aboriginal people in terms of both
their formal involvement in governmental processes and
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consideration of their interests and preferences. In the
days when far-reaching decisions were made in Ottawa,
most notably by the Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development (DIAND, now Indian and North-
ern Affairs Canada, or INAC), and the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), the processes leading to
those decisions rarely accorded aboriginal people any-
thing approaching meaningful involvement.
At the same time, the paper is no uncritical paean to
land-claim boards. Individual boards exhibit serious flaws
(and some have been painfully dysfunctional), while sys-
tematic problems and shortcomings are evident across the
entire range of land-claim boards. Among other things,
they have been criticized for providing little more than
token aboriginal influence over land and wildlife deci-
sions, for remaining (via funding arrangements and ap-
pointment provisions) essentially under the control of the
federal government (or, less frequently, the territorial
governments) and, perhaps most damningly, for undercut-
ting rather than enhancing aboriginal peoples’ self-deter-
mination and autonomy by enmeshing them in Western
modes of thought and behaviour. Critics maintain that
aboriginal influence under the board regime falls woefully
short of what might be achieved under full-fledged abo-
riginal self-government.
All these criticisms carry some validity. Clearly, sig-
nificant room for improvement exists both within indi-
vidual boards and across the overall board regime. However,
much the same could be said of any set of political institu-
tions. Accepting that it would certainly be possible to
imagine better ways of ensuring aboriginal influence, or
indeed control, over land and wildlife decisions, the ques-
tion of possible alternatives to land-claim boards emerges.
This may be too large a question to resolve in one limited
paper, but my examination of the boards’ strengths and
weaknesses suggests that, if land-claim boards are meas-
ured against the previous land and wildlife governance
systems (“the alternative”) rather than ideal but likely
unattainable regimes (“the Almighty”), they may be judged
successful.
Before the emergence of co-management regimes, the
state management system, which afforded aboriginal peo-
ple such minimal influence, was by no means the sole
mechanism for regulation of wildlife harvesting and re-
lated activities across the Canadian North. Feit demon-
strates that in that period, northern aboriginal people
engaged in significant “self-management” of wildlife re-
sources entirely outside the state system, sometimes as
“local resistance to state forms of management” (Feit,
1988:74), and further, that self-management continues in
the co-management era. Accordingly, the question is not
whether aboriginal influence is greater in the land-claim
boards reviewed in this paper than it was in the self-
management processes that have co-existed with state
management for many years. By definition, it could not be.
Rather, the question is whether, within the state system,
that influence has increased with the advent of land-claim
boards. For while the boards are unquestionably part of the
state system, and indeed may be thought of as state con-
structs, a central rationale for their creation was the en-
hancement of aboriginal influence over key wildlife and
environmental decisions.
Elements of self-management will doubtless persist,
though it is well to ask whether the advance of co-manage-
ment will complement or undermine self-management. A
wholesale return to the original aboriginal methods of
stewarding the land and animals used before the imposition
of state management is simply not possible. An important
reason underlying this assumption is that the boards under
consideration here regulate not only wildlife use, but also
major development projects such as pipelines, mines, and
roads, which have no analogues in pre-contact aboriginal
experience. Other alternatives to the boards could be imag-
ined, but clear ideas as to what such regimes might entail, or
how they might come to be, have yet to emerge.
Following a brief overview of the nature and range of
land-claim boards, I consider the extent of aboriginal influ-
ence in these boards; the powers exercised by the boards and
the decision-making clout they exercise; the question of
their independence from other governments, both public
and aboriginal; and their incorporation of traditional knowl-
edge (TK) into their operations and decisions.
NORTHERN LAND-CLAIM BOARDS: AN OVERVIEW
An essential starting place is the recognition that the
roughly two dozen boards established across the territorial
North over the past two decades under the comprehensive
land claims differ fundamentally from most of the myriad
boards and political institutions permeating northern gov-
ernance. As “modern-day treaties,” comprehensive claims
are constitutionally protected under section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. Accordingly, the boards, as inte-
gral components of the claims, enjoy quasi-constitutional
status. This status accords them importance and perma-
nence far beyond that of run-of-the-mill boards.
Land-claim boards, in a phrase explicitly used mainly in
Nunavut, but applicable across the territories, are “institu-
tions of public government.” They do not constitute a form
of aboriginal self-government, but neither are they part of
the federal or territorial governments. They represent a
new and unique set of institutions existing at the intersec-
tion of the three orders of government (aboriginal, territo-
rial, and federal). Although specifics of claim negotiations
varied across time and regions, generally speaking the
boards emerged as a compromise between two quite dif-
ferent visions of governance. Aboriginal negotiators wished
to incorporate as much control as possible over land and
wildlife decisions into self-government regimes. The fed-
eral position, however, was that the public interest in such
matters required control by public institutions. The boards
thus emerged as a means of retaining public government in
land and wildlife issues while distancing actual decisions
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and operations from federal and territorial government
control and ensuring direct and meaningful participation
by aboriginal peoples (Fenge, 1992). This compromise is
evident, for example, in Article 5.1.2 of the Nunavut Land
Claims Agreement, which states that “there is a need for an
effective role for Inuit in all aspects of wildlife manage-
ment, including research,” while the following sentence
stipulates that “government retains the ultimate responsi-
bility for wildlife management.”
The formal mechanisms by which boards are created
vary. Some, like the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board,
have their existence and mandate explicitly set out in the
text of the claim itself. Others, for example the land and
water boards in the Mackenzie Valley, came into being
with the passage of federal legislation. (This latter situa-
tion might imply that the federal government could also
legislate an end to such boards. Indeed, Parliament could
pass legislation to abolish, say, the Mackenzie Valley
Land and Water Board, but it would then be required under
the Gwich’in, Sahtu, and Tlicho claims to establish an
equivalent board with the same mandate and powers.)
The boards’ jurisdiction is largely limited to wildlife,
land, and environmental issues. Very few boards have
mandates that extend more than marginally into conven-
tionally defined social and cultural policy areas such as
education, health, and social welfare. One exception is the
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board
(MVEIRB), whose legislation stipulates that “impact on
the environment” is to include “any effect on the social and
cultural environment,” with the result that in conducting
environmental assessments it “has the authority to con-
sider socioeconomic impacts and impacts on the cultural
well-being of the residents and communities in the Mac-
kenzie Valley” (Donihee, 2001:33).
Land-claim boards fall into four broad categories. Boards
in the first group deal with wildlife management. Their
activities include setting general policy, as well as specific
harvest levels for various species; directing wildlife re-
search; and supporting local hunters and trappers’ organi-
zations. The Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board
is an example. A second major set of boards is responsible
for land-use planning: such bodies as the Gwich’in Land
Use Planning Board set the frameworks that govern eco-
nomic development projects, location of transportation
facilities, and the like. A third group, which is involved in
licensing projects that might disturb or damage the envi-
ronment, has two subsets. One subset, illustrated by the
Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, issues licences
and permits to projects ranging from small gravel pits to
oil and gas pipelines. The other subset conducts environ-
mental impact assessments on proposed projects, usually
the larger ones, as part of the licensing process. An exam-
ple is the MVEIRB. The work of these boards is closely
related to, though nonetheless separate from, the boards
that issue permits and licences. Boards in the final group,
represented by the Nunavut Arbitration Board, serve as
dispute resolution bodies for claim-related issues. Thus
far, they have had little significance; some have yet to have
any cases referred to them.
Most boards have between 7 and 10 members, though a
few are somewhat larger or smaller. Except for the under-
used arbitration panels, the board members have the sup-
port of a permanent, full-time professional staff (in some
cases numbering only four or five, in others, a dozen or
more) working out of well-equipped offices. A number of
boards make extensive use of modern communication
technology, for example, by maintaining online registries
that make available the full texts of submissions and
technical reports pertaining to projects under review.
In most cases, board members are formally appointed
by the federal government, after nomination by one of the
three parties to the claim (the aboriginal organization, the
territorial government, and the federal government). Typi-
cally, half the board members are nominees of the aborigi-
nal organization, although on some boards each party
nominates one-third of the members. A number of board
members nominated by government are also government
employees, although on some boards this practice is ex-
plicitly prohibited.
Key to understanding the nature and role of the land-
claim boards is the fundamental principle that they and
their members are to act independently of the governments
and organizations that nominated or appointed them. The
legal frameworks establishing some boards explicitly state
that members are to act “in the public interest” and not take
direction from the parties that nominated them. Like judges,
members are expected to use their best judgement and to
reach decisions on the basis of the evidence before them.
As might be expected, however, the question of board
independence is not as straightforward as this simple
formulation would have it. This question is examined in
more detail below.
Funding for land-claim boards (for large, active boards,
several million dollars a year) comes almost entirely from
the federal government (the territorial governments pro-
vide some funding, but this is mostly redirected federal
money). Funding, of course, impinges on independence
and is considered as part of the analysis below.
In a limited number of cases, boards possess the legal
capacity to make final, binding decisions on permits,
harvest quotas, and the like. In most cases, however, and
certainly in all matters with far-reaching implications, the
boards have only advisory powers. They make recommen-
dations to government, which need not take heed of the
boards’ advice. Put this way, the boards appear to wield
little real clout because governments seem completely free
to ignore their recommendations. This appearance is de-
ceiving, however. The reality is quite different, as dis-
cussed below.
Land-claim boards decide, advise, and recommend.
They have no powers of enforcement and rely on federal
and territorial officials (e.g., wildlife officers and environ-
mental inspectors) to put their recommendations into op-
eration and to police the licences and plans they issue.
74 • G. WHITE
METHODS
A review of primary documents and secondary litera-
ture relating to land-claim boards in the territorial North,
supplemented by personal interviews and observation of
selected board meetings, provided the basis of this paper.
The interviews, all of which I conducted in person, were
unstructured and covered all aspects of northern land-
claim boards. Several dozen people agreed to be inter-
viewed: members, former members, and staff of various
land-claim boards; officials of the federal and territorial
governments; and elected and appointed officials of vari-
ous aboriginal organizations. These interviews, conducted
on a not-for-attribution basis between 2000 and 2007, took
place in Cambridge Bay, Dawson City, Igloolik, Inuvik,
Iqaluit, Ottawa-Hull, Yellowknife, and Whitehorse. A
number of respondents were interviewed more than once;
several were interviewed three or four times. In a number
of instances, additional information was obtained through
follow-up telephone calls and e-mails. Direct quotations
and paraphrases from those involved in board processes
that are not otherwise attributed were taken from the notes
of these interviews.
In terms of observation, I attended meetings of the
Inuvialuit Game Council and the Wildlife Management
Advisory Committee (NWT) in Inuvik in December 2001
and in December 2006, as well as those of the Nunavut
Wildlife Management Board in Igloolik (September 2005)
and Cambridge Bay (December 2007). I attended public
hearings held by the Yukon Water Board in Whitehorse
(February 2003 and June 2006) and the MVEIRB (Hay
River, February 2004). I also attended a TK Workshop that
the MVEIRB organized in Yellowknife in November 2002.
The direct quotations of participants’ comments from this
workshop are taken from my meeting notes.
The data in Table 1 summarizing the cultural back-
grounds of board members were drawn from biographical
information available on board web sites; documents pub-
lished by boards, governments, and aboriginal organiza-
tions; and personal knowledge of board staff and other
persons familiar with the political and bureaucratic elites
of the three territories.
POWERS OF THE LAND-CLAIM BOARDS
For aboriginal people to wield significant influence
over decisions affecting their traditional lands and the
wildlife on them through participation in land-claim boards,
the boards themselves must possess real power. At first
glance, though, the boards established under the compre-
hensive claims would seem to exercise little power, serv-
ing only in an advisory capacity to the federal and territorial
governments, where the real power resides. However, as is
so often the case in politics, formal relationships tell only
part of the tale; in terms of effective decision making,
land-claim boards can and do enjoy considerable power.
Even in purely formal terms, land-claim boards have
certain limited authority to render decisions beyond the
scope of federal or territorial ministers’ power to override.
By way of illustration, although the federal INAC minister
may reject Class A licences issued by the Nunavut Water
Board (on large projects, such as diamond mines), he or
she must issue written reasons for the rejection. More
significantly, the minister has scope only to approve or
reject a licence and may not alter any of its terms and
conditions. Moreover, most of the licences the board
issues are Class B licences (on relatively small projects),
which lie beyond the authority of the minister to alter or
reject. Similarly, some of the wildlife management boards
control millions of dollars in trust funds earmarked for
research and allocate those funds to individuals and insti-
tutions for wildlife research, all without ministerial in-
volvement or approval. Land-claim boards or their
emanations also enjoy limited legal authority to create
binding legal instruments; under the Inuvialuit Final Agree-
ment (IFA), for example, local hunters and trappers’ com-
mittees can pass what amount to legally enforceable
regulations under the Northwest Territories Wildlife Act
(Binder and Hanbidge, 1993). Other examples could be
cited.
On major issues, however, land-claim boards lack final
decision-making authority and are restricted to providing
advice and recommendations to federal and territorial
governments. But this advisory function is a far more
potent prerogative than might be thought, in large measure
because most board recommendations are framed in what
might be termed a “negative option.” In most governance
regimes, advisory bodies typically submit proposals to
government and hope that government will not only agree
with the substance of the recommendations but also accord
them sufficiently high priority to act on them. When land-
claim boards make recommendations, in contrast, the
responsible ministers usually have only a limited time,
sometimes as short as 30 days, more often 60 or 90 days,
in which to reject or (in some circumstances) vary the
recommendations. Otherwise, the recommendations take
effect. Accordingly, for land-claim boards the usual politi-
cal calculus, whereby advisory bodies must expend politi-
cal capital in an effort to convince ministers to accept
recommendations, is reversed: ministers must expend their
political resources (including laying out their objections in
writing) and must do so quickly, or the land-claim boards’
recommendations come into effect by default.
Ministerial rejection of such board recommendations is
not unknown, but it is unusual. Few land-claim boards
have had more than one or two recommendations over-
turned. Undoubtedly, many board recommendations have
been allowed to pass into policy because government
officials have recognized the high quality of the boards’
research, consultation, and deliberations and accord their
“advice” the respect it deserves. Also, boards have made
recommendations that governments would have preferred
not to deal with but could not ignore by virtue of the
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“negative option” provision and the boards’ political le-
gitimacy. A good example is the Nunavut Wildlife Man-
agement Board’s 1996 recommendation that Nunavut Inuit
be permitted to harvest a bowhead whale, which the fed-
eral minister approved despite considerable domestic and
international pressure (Hogh, 2000).
Two public servants (one federal, one territorial), re-
viewing their experience with ministerial responses to
land-claim boards’ recommendations, commented that “in
practice [ministerial] rejection or modification of a deci-
sion carries with it a high political risk and is rare”
(Bannon and Dunlop, 1998:4). A similar conclusion was
reached from the aboriginal point of view: Simmons and
Netro (1995:171) noted that although the Yukon Regional
Resource Councils, which are closely linked to the Yukon
Fish and Wildlife Management Board, only offer “advice”
to government, it is “advice with a difference…this is a
considerable restriction on the traditional powers of a
Minister of the Crown.” It may even be that, as Usher
(1993:113) noted for the Beverly-Qamanirjuaq Caribou
Management Board, “ministers and senior managers seem
to have recognized the political advantages of letting the
Board take responsibility for some difficult decisions
rather than imposing their own solutions.”
ABORIGINAL PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE
IN LAND-CLAIM BOARDS
A necessary but not sufficient condition for genuine
aboriginal influence on land-claim boards is a substantial
aboriginal presence on the boards. If only token numbers of
aboriginal people serve as board members, it would be
difficult to argue that aboriginal interests and worldviews
are taken seriously into account in board deliberations. A
quick look at the data, however, demonstrates that indeed
aboriginal peoples are well represented in the membership
of land-claim boards. Aboriginal organizations almost al-
ways put forward aboriginal persons as their nominees, and
territorial governments frequently nominate aboriginal per-
sons, as does (on occasion) the federal government. Accord-
ingly, on many boards, aboriginal members constitute a
clear majority. Table 1 presents data, as of 1 January 2008,
on the membership of eight boards across the three territo-
ries, two from Nunavut, two from the Yukon, and four from
the Northwest Territories, two from the Mackenzie Valley
and two from the Inuvialuit region (where the boards estab-
lished under the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement differ
fundamentally from those subsequently established in the
Mackenzie Valley). These boards are not presented as a
strictly representative sample of all land-claim boards, but
the pattern of their membership composition almost cer-
tainly holds across the entire range of boards.
Table 1 indicates the number of aboriginal and non-
aboriginal persons appointed to the boards since they were
created (or, in the case of the Yukon Water Board, recast as
a land-claim board under the 1993 Yukon Umbrella Final
Agreement), and within those categories, the numbers of
male and female members. The picture which emerges is an
approximate one, in the sense that it does not take into
account the highly variable tenure of board members: some
serve for only a year or two, while others stay on for a decade
or more. As well, a person who served two or more non-
continuous terms on a board was counted only once.
Dichotomizing land-claim board members on the basis
of their aboriginality is not meant to imply that non-
aboriginal members routinely adopt opposing positions to
those of aboriginal board members; to the contrary, board
proceedings and decisions are more typically marked by
consensus among all members. Nor is it meant to imply
either that all aboriginal members always agree on issues
coming before the boards, any more than all non-aborigi-
nal members are always in agreement. When disagreement
does arise, members’ positions reflect a range of factors
that could include personal views, cultural background,
regional perspectives, and institutional affiliation.
Though on several dimensions, there are limitations on
the inferences to be drawn from the raw numbers of land-
claim board members who are aboriginal, the data in Table 1
are instructive. The proportion of aboriginal board members
on the eight boards ranges from over 40% to nearly 90%,
and not surprisingly, the highest proportions are registered
in Nunavut, where Inuit constitute close to 85% of the
population. An analysis of Nunavut “Institutions of Public
TABLE 1. Cultural backgrounds of land-claim board members (as of 1 January 2008). M = male, F = female, UFA = Umbrella Final
Agreement, and IFA = Inuvialuit Final Agreement.
Aboriginal Non-Aboriginal
Land-claim Board M F M F Total Percentage Aboriginal
Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board 12 1 12 5 30 43
Yukon Water Board (post UFA) 13 3 13 5 341 42
Nunavut Impact Review Board 13 6 3 0 22 86
Nunavut Wildlife Management Board 25 1 4 1 31 84
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board 6 4 8 1 19 53
Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board 15 5 7 3 30 67
Environmental Impact Review Board–IFA 9 1 13 1 24 42
Wildlife Management Advisory Committee (NWT)–IFA 16 1 20 0 37 46
1
 Excludes one female and three male members whose cultural background could not be determined.
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Government” or IPGs (the common term in Nunavut for
land-claim boards) conducted as part of the first five-year
review of the Nunavut claim found that some 86% of land-
claim board members were Inuit (Vertes et al., 1999). The
figures for the Wildlife Management Advisory Council
(NWT) underestimate Inuvialuit participation, in that they
include a substantial number of alternate members (to fill in
should regular members be unavailable). Although the
Inuvialuit Game Council also appoints alternates, they are
not as numerous as the government-appointed alternates,
who are overwhelmingly non-aboriginal.
A small but significant fact emerging from Table 1 is
that nearly half the members of the Yukon Water Board
have been citizens of Yukon First Nations. These data
include only appointments made after the finalization of
the Umbrella Final Agreement (the essential framework
for the Council of Yukon Indians claim). This board
existed, in different form, prior to the claim, but in the nine
years (1987 – 96) before implementation of the claim be-
gan, only one of 12 Yukon Water Board members (8%)
was from a First Nation. Clearly, the transition to land-
claim board status has been accompanied by a vast in-
crease in First Nations participation in the board’s work.
Given that board members’ tenure varies substantially,
the figures in Table 1 could be recalculated on the basis of
years of service by aboriginal board members, but it is
unlikely that a substantially different picture would emerge.
Either indicator—the simple proportion of aboriginal board
members or the proportion of aboriginal board service-
years—is at best a rough proxy for actual aboriginal
influence. The data in the table serve adequately to demon-
strate that there are enough aboriginal members on land-
claim boards to make a difference.
Table 1 demonstrates clearly that, while aboriginal peo-
ple are well represented among the members of land-claim
boards, women are dramatically underrepresented, as is the
case in so many other facets of northern governance. Roughly
one board member in six is a woman (the proportions are
similar for both aboriginal and non-aboriginal women).
These findings are similar to those emerging from a study by
Pauktuutit, the national Inuit women’s organization, which
found that only 9% of the elected positions on local hunters
and trappers’ organizations (HTOs) in Nunavut were held
by women (CBC News, 2006).
The raw numbers, of course, indicate aboriginal partici-
pation in land-claim boards, but what of influence? An
authoritative, systematic assessment of aboriginal influ-
ence, if indeed such an exercise would even be possible, is
beyond the scope of this paper, but a range of indicators
suggests that indeed aboriginal influence on land-claim
boards is substantial.
A telling incident occurred at a TK workshop in
Yellowknife in 2002. A young Dene man angrily attacked
the MVEIRB as unrepresentative of the local aboriginal
people, proclaiming: “Your [MVEIRB] views don’t fit
with ours ... the real decision-making power should go to
the communities ... the MVEIRB doesn’t really work.” At
this, an aboriginal MVEIRB member, a respected elder
with long years of Dene politics behind him, responded
with equal force, defending the claim regime of which the
board is a key element: “Twenty-five years ago we were
nothing ... now I can make a decision and tell the govern-
ment what to do ... I sit on the board to do the work our
elders said we should do 25 years ago.”
In interviews, aboriginal board members, as well as offi-
cials of aboriginal organizations, generally took the position
that land-claim boards do offer aboriginal people significant
influence over land and resource matters, although some
expressed a desire for a good deal more. A veteran Inuit
leader, for example, acknowledging that the Nunavut land-
claim boards are for many Inuit discouragingly formal and
bureaucratic, accepts this as “a necessary evil” in light of their
notable successes “in bringing issues down to the people in
the communities and speaking their language.” Similarly, an
official of Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI), the Inuit
land-claim organization, observed that “bridging the two
worlds of Inuit ways and Western ways is the real challenge.
Bringing the Inuit way into land and wildlife decisions is the
strongest argument in favour of the IPGs in the first place…the
IPGs create the opportunity for the little guy in the commu-
nity to have an impact.”
Other interviewees noted with approval the fact that the
boards charged with environmental regulation are required
by law to ensure that communities within the claim areas,
many of which are overwhelmingly aboriginal, are in-
formed and consulted about proposed projects and their
potential impact. Not only must communities be accorded
the opportunity to bring forward their views on such propos-
als to the boards reviewing them, but the proponents must
respond in public to community concerns. These require-
ments do not, of course, bestow upon the communities the
authority to reject proposals, but they enhance aboriginal
influence over the process, and indeed, its outcome.
The closest approximation of a survey assessing abo-
riginal influence on land-claim boards is found in the
initial five-year review of the Nunavut claim. The re-
searchers conducting the review asked both business lead-
ers and representatives of local, Inuit-dominated HTOs
about Inuit influence on public policy. Nine of ten
businesspeople were of the view that Inuit have effective
control over some or most important decisions affecting
land and water, while all 14 HTO officials who responded
said that they had more rather than less control over
wildlife decisions since the claim came into effect (Vertes
et al., 1999). Neither group was asked directly about the
land-claim boards involved in these areas, but given the
boards’ status as central players in land, water, and wild-
life decisions, it is reasonable to assume that respondents’
answers can be taken as positive assessments of Inuit
influence through the boards.
The secondary literature tends to the view that aborigi-
nal people enjoy meaningful influence over land and
wildlife decisions through their participation on land-
claim boards and that this influence far exceeds what had
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been possible prior to the claims. In reviewing this litera-
ture, it is important to recognize that not all assessments of
aboriginal influence in co-management regimes, some of
which reach negative conclusions, look at land-claim
boards. Nadasdy (2003), for example, found little First
Nation influence in the workings of the Ruby Range Sheep
Steering Committee, a non-claim-based co-management
board in the southwest Yukon. Although some assess-
ments of aboriginal influence in another non-claim co-
management institution, the Beverly-Qamanirjuaq Caribou
Management Board, are positive (Usher, 1993; Treseder
and Honda-McNeil, 1999), others are far less sanguine
(Kendrick, 2000; Spak, 2005).
In a comprehensive analysis of the first decade of the
Inuvialuit Final Agreement, long-time observer and par-
ticipant Lindsay Staples concludes unequivocally that,
since the signing of the claim, Inuvialuit involvement in
wildlife management has “improved dramatically” (Sta-
ples, 1995:3). In his words, “The participation of the
Inuvialuit in the IFA management regime is both extensive
and substantive, and has had a significant influence on
government decision making” (Staples, 1995:49). Binder
and Hanbidge (1993) are similarly sanguine about the IFA;
in an early analysis, Doubleday (1989), while adopting a
wait-and-see stance before rendering judgement, was op-
timistic about the prospects for Inuvialuit influence through
the IFA and its boards. A decade later, Treseder and
Honda-McNeil (1999) weighed the successes and failures
of wildlife co-management boards and found that the
former outweighed the latter. Usher (2003:379), who has
decades of experience as both member of and advisor to
land-claim boards plus a wide-ranging academic perspec-
tive, wrote: “The comanagement arrangements [of land-
claim boards] work well in principle and in practice for
both humans and the environment.” Galbraith et al.
(2007:36) rate the environmental assessment process of
the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board
as “exemplary,” in part because it goes significantly far-
ther in meaningfully involving aboriginal people in envi-
ronmental regulation than most such processes in Canada
and elsewhere. At the same time, they also recognize
shortcomings in this regard, for example, aboriginal peo-
ple’s mistrust of the process, a lack of capacity to partici-
pate effectively, and insufficient resources devoted to TK.
However, not everyone shares these generally positive
assessments. As discussed below, some harsh critics of the
wildlife management land-claim boards dispute the propo-
sition that through them aboriginal influence over their
land and resources has improved substantially, if indeed at
all, since the days of the DIAND-controlled regime.
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
Central to any evaluation of aboriginal influence on
land-claim boards is the question of board independence
from government. To the extent that boards are controlled,
directly or indirectly, by government, aboriginal influence
will necessarily be, at best, limited. Three elements im-
pinge on board independence: the appointment process,
the orientation and behaviour of board members, and
funding levels and processes.
Appointments
Most appointments of board members, even those nomi-
nated by aboriginal organizations and governments, are
formally made by the federal government. On a few boards,
such as the Wek’eezhii Land and Water Board and the
Wildlife Management Advisory Council (North Slope),
formal appointment power is lodged with the aboriginal
organization or government. As devolution of jurisdic-
tional authority over fields currently held by Ottawa pro-
ceeds, the territorial governments are likely to become the
appointing agency. This change has already occurred in
the Yukon. Since 2005, with the devolution of authority
over most natural resources, members of the Yukon Water
Board have been appointed by the Yukon government.
Prospective board members are subject to a criminal
background check, but other than nominees who fail to
clear that hurdle, those proposed for board membership by
aboriginal governments or organizations are routinely
accepted and duly appointed by the federal (or territorial)
government. Neither the public record nor the interviews
revealed any significant concerns about government will-
ingness to appoint persons nominated by aboriginal or-
ganizations and governments. Discontent was repeatedly
registered over the length of time it took for Ottawa to
move forward with proposed appointments. Delays were
not interpreted as attempts at interference or control, but as
an indication of Ottawa’s normally sluggish procedures
and, more significantly, as a measure of the low priority it
accords northern land-claim boards. Some boards have
publicly complained about the lack of federal attention to
filling vacant board positions, leaving them for months
with insufficient numbers to reach quorum and thus unable
to meet and transact business (CBC News, 2005).
One recent and highly controversial appointment raised
concerns about Ottawa’s use of its appointment preroga-
tive to influence an important board. When a replacement
was needed for the chair of the Mackenzie Valley Land and
Water Board, it was generally expected that, as in the past,
Ottawa would appoint one of the three persons shortlisted
by the board itself. The federal minister, however, rejected
the board’s recommendations and appointed instead an
individual who had been the focus of intense conflict and
accusations of bias when he had previously chaired the
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board.
Particularly because, unlike other board members, he was
an INAC employee, concerns were expressed that he had
been parachuted onto the board to do Ottawa’s bidding on
issues relating to the proposed Mackenzie Valley pipeline.
His appointment generated debilitating discord within the
board, including a call by board members for his resignation.
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The situation, which hamstrung the board for months, was
resolved only when the chair resigned (Bryant, 2005;
Danylchuk, 2005; Hunsley, 2005).
The same individual was also at the centre of the most
noteworthy contretemps involving the obverse of the gov-
ernment’s appointment power: the ability to remove board
members. In general, interviews revealed all but negligi-
ble concern that Ottawa was abusing its legal (but seldom
invoked) authority to dismiss board members. The out-
standing exception was the ouster of a prominent and
outspoken member of the MVEIRB, whose appointment
was revoked following his attacks on the chair for promot-
ing the agenda of the federal government. Although this
episode dramatically raised apprehensions about Ottawa’s
commitment to board independence, it is important to
recognize that the deposed board member had been a
federal nominee. Had he been a nominee of an aboriginal
government or organization, the political implications
would have been more far-reaching.
Nor have territorial governments been immune from
criticism that they have used their appointment (or nomi-
nation) power to sway board decisions. For example, one
of the toughest, most divisive issues faced in recent years
by the Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board in-
volved game farms. When his term expired, a board mem-
ber who was vocally opposed to game farming was replaced
by a person who runs a game farm. “You don’t get much
more blatantly obvious than that,” as one observer com-
mented, when it comes to political interference.
Board Members’ Orientation and Behaviour
Except for the Inuvialuit boards (members of which are
explicitly recognized as representing, in the sense of pro-
moting the interests of, the parties that nominated them),
a central principle is that, once appointed, board members
are to exercise their best judgement on the issues before
them and not take instruction or direction from nominating
parties. At the same time, as is the case with appointments
to quasi-judicial agencies throughout Canada, it is widely
presumed and accepted that the nominating parties are
confident that their nominees hold compatible views.
Although boards collectively, and members individually,
take seriously the duty to be independent, it is not unusual for
board members to feel obligated to take positions that are in
line with the preferences of the party that nominated them.
Yet this is quite different from parties directing “their”
members and, in that members’ views will often be similar to
those of their nominating parties, does not per se constitute a
significant threat to board independence.
A special case of board members acting in ways that
their nominating parties would want occurs when govern-
ment employees serve on boards that deal with issues
directly affecting their departments. As noted above, civil
servants are explicitly excluded from membership on some
boards, but on others it is hard to imagine that their status as
government employees does not affect how they respond to
certain issues. Although the interviews confirmed that
civil servants’ behaviour as board members is sometimes
determined by adherence to government policy, the inter-
viewees also disclosed important instances of civil serv-
ants who at board meetings had adopted positions running
directly contrary to government policy. One board execu-
tive director contrasted the behaviour of two bureaucrat
board members: “One is almost reporting minute by minute
to his director general; another seems to have very little
communication with his department.” A review of the IFA
environment and wildlife provisions illustrated how sig-
nificant this issue may be: “In one case, a government
employee was subjected to career-threatening pressures
because of a decision of the joint body of which he was a
member was at odds with the views of his senior manag-
ers” (Resource Futures International, 1993:32).
That aboriginal organizations may view board members
they have nominated as “their” members was evident in
interviews. It may also be seen in the ads they run solicit-
ing applications for board positions (all three parties rou-
tinely publish ads and brochures seeking potential
candidates). By way of illustration, NTI recently put out a
call for candidates for the Nunavut Impact Review Board
and the Nunavut Water Board, which included this state-
ment: “Candidates must be actively and personally com-
mitted to representing the interests of Beneficiaries of the
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement” (NTI, 2005). The ad
did not indicate that only Inuit (“beneficiaries”) would be
considered, nor did it imply that members would be ex-
pected to take direction from NTI. Nonetheless, the clear
signal that in NTI’s view the member should represent
Inuit interests, as opposed to the interests of all Nunavut
residents, is significant.
Two recent episodes involving boards that had become
dysfunctional suggest that, for some key northern aborigi-
nal political figures, land-claim boards are ultimately seen
as emanations of the federal state. In 2005, longstanding
tensions within the Nunavut Planning Commission erupted
with demands by board members for the resignation of the
chair (a veteran Inuit politician) on the grounds of finan-
cial irregularities and his refusal to call board meetings;
board members also attempted to hold meetings without
the chair. The chair reacted by writing to the federal
minister, seeking “direction” in resolving the situation,
and leaving it up to the minister as to whether the Nunavut
Government and NTI should be consulted (Bell, 2005).
Simultaneously, Northwest Territories Premier Joe Handley
responded to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board
imbroglio mentioned earlier by demanding that the federal
minister do whatever was needed to get the board back on
track (Danylchuk, 2005).
The orientation and behaviour of board staff is not
usually relevant to the issue of board independence, but
does impinge directly on it in at least one instance. Staff of
the Yukon Salmon Committee (technically a subcommit-
tee of the Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board
although relations between the two bodies are cordial but
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distant), including its top official, the executive secretary,
are employees of the federal Department of Fisheries and
Oceans, typically working part-time for the Salmon Com-
mittee. This situation contributes to a public perception
that the committee is an arm of the DFO. One interviewee
found it significant that committee staff speak in terms of
“us” (meaning DFO) and “them” (meaning the Salmon
Committee). On occasion, this staffing arrangement has a
real effect on the committee’s independence. As one staff
person put it, “On some issues, the advice to the committee
would be different if we didn’t work for the department.”
Conversely, though, one knowledgeable observer of the
Yukon Water Board argues that the fact that board em-
ployees are formally employees of the territorial govern-
ment enhances their capacity to resist occasional
government pressure because of the security they enjoy (as
opposed to being employees of a small, stand-alone agency).
Funding
None of the land-claim boards has the authority or
capacity to generate any meaningful revenue, so they are
all but entirely dependent on government (normally the
federal government) for funding. This situation raises a
key question of board independence: does what has been
termed the golden rule of politics, “He who has the gold
rules,” apply to boards?
Two dimensions of funding are germane to answering
this question: funding levels and funding mechanisms.
Both in interviews and in public documents, members and
staff of land-claim boards express a mixture of satisfaction
and displeasure with overall funding levels. As with virtu-
ally any governmental organization, there is never enough
money to do everything worthwhile that boards would like
to do, but sufficient money is usually forthcoming to take
care of most core board responsibilities.
Detailed though they may be, comprehensive claims are
fleshed out by even more detailed implementation contracts
(agreed to by the three parties), which set out, among other
things, basic funding levels for boards. The figures in these
contracts are usually supplemented with funds earmarked for
special projects or needs. For regulatory boards, which can-
not predict with any certainty the number and length of
hearings they will be required to conduct in a given year, it is
understood that government will accede to the costs incurred
in such hearings, and by and large, boards have been satisfied
with the funding they have received for hearings.
The Nunavut land-claim boards that made submissions
to Justice Thomas Berger, in his role as conciliator in the
deadlocked negotiations over a second implementation
contract, did express frustration that they were unable to
pursue what they saw as essential activities for lack of
funds (Berger, 2005). In the Northwest Territories, the
counsel for the MVEIRB has written that “the federal
government has not provided the resources or the support
needed by the Mackenzie Valley Boards” (Donihee,
2001:47). Overall, despite a certain level of complaining
about the constant need for more money, land-claim boards
are funded reasonably well enough to discharge their
responsibilities. To the extent that they complain about
funding levels, they do not perceive this deficiency as a
significant threat to their independence.
More problematic are issues relating to the mechanisms
of funding. As noted, basic board needs are set out in the
implementation contracts (although the prolonged stale-
mate in negotiating a new contract for the Nunavut claim
raises important questions about their status). However, to
gain access to these funds, boards are required to submit
detailed budgetary projections and financial audits to Ot-
tawa and generally acquiesce to the federal government’s
financial management processes. Aside from the adminis-
trative burden these requirements impose on the boards,
they come with the ever-present possibility that requests
will be turned down or reduced, a clear threat to board
independence. Tied in with such concerns is the reality that
the federal bureaucrats who deal with board funding tend to
be specialists in process rather than policy substance. As
one board official put it, “These officials are not associated
in any direct way with resource management and seem only
loosely connected to the day to day exigencies of board
operations. This in my view is a strained way to administer
funding for public government resource management insti-
tutions and it causes problems” (Donihee, 2001:40).
A small but symbolically important illustration is Otta-
wa’s control over the setting of the per diem payments to
board members. Boards across the North have complained
that their members’ per diems are inappropriately low, to
the point where they create a significant disincentive for
serving on boards. For example, although rates have been
increased since then, in 2001, MVEIRB members were
paid an honorarium of $200 a day, while a panel member
of the federal Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency
received $575 a day.
From the board perspective, improvements have been
made, such as Ottawa’s shift in 2000 from funding boards
through “contribution agreements” (which, among other
things, required repayment of unspent balances at year
end) to a less constraining “flexible transfer payment”
process (White, 2002). Yet major funding issues remain
that impinge directly on board independence, as evidenced
by Ottawa’s continuing refusal to use the arbitration proc-
esses set out in the Nunavut claim to resolve disagree-
ments about board funding levels. In the words of Justice
Berger (2005:16), “The Inuit can be forgiven for seeing the
refusal to arbitrate the issue of adequate funding as a
mechanism for simply imposing Canada’s determination
as to appropriate funding levels.”
TK IN LAND-CLAIM BOARDS
One of the great potential strengths of land-claim boards,
at least from an aboriginal point of view, is their commit-
ment to incorporating traditional knowledge into not only
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their decisions and recommendations, but also their opera-
tions. It would be hard to build a case for meaningful
aboriginal influence via land-claim boards if the boards
paid little attention to such a central component of aborigi-
nal existence as traditional knowledge. A full account of
the nature of TK is far beyond the scope of this paper. The
concept of TK informing this paper is Berkes’ (1999:8)
well-known formulation: “a cumulative body of knowl-
edge, practice and belief, evolving by adaptive processes
and handed down through generations by cultural trans-
mission, about the relationship of living beings (including
humans) with one another and with their environment.”
Assessing northern land-claim boards’ use of TK is to
some extent a question of whether the snowmobile’s gas
tank is half-full or half-empty. Across the territorial North,
land-claim boards now routinely base decisions on the
traditional knowledge of local aboriginal people. This
marks a very significant departure from earlier state-
controlled land and wildlife regimes in which TK was
largely or entirely ignored by government decision mak-
ers. Wildlife management boards certainly rely heavily on
scientific data obtained through aerial surveys, DNA test-
ing, satellite monitoring of radio-collars and the like. Yet
they also listen carefully to the experiences and percep-
tions of local hunters and elders with extensive first-hand
knowledge of the land. As well, wildlife boards make
concerted efforts at incorporating TK and harvest infor-
mation provided by local hunters into the gathering and
assessment of baseline data on the size, health, and migra-
tion patterns of various species populations. Some impor-
tant studies, such as the Nunavut Wildlife Management
Board’s landmark Nunavut Harvest Study and its Inuit
Bowhead Knowledge Study have relied primarily on lo-
cally gathered TK.
TK also plays a significant role in the work of the
environmental regulatory boards established under the
claims. The legislation establishing the Mackenzie Valley
Environmental Review Board, for example, explicitly re-
quires the board to take TK into consideration in its work,
and the board’s policy documents reiterate its commitment
to TK (Christensen and Grant, 2007). Nor is this commit-
ment mere lip service, as two recent board decisions
illustrate. In 2004, the board recommended to the federal
minister that a proposal for a very small diamond explora-
tion project at Drybones Bay on Great Slave Lake be
rejected, principally on the grounds that for nearby abo-
riginal people the area is “a vitally important cultural and
heritage area” that stood to be significantly and adversely
affected by exploration and development activity
(MVEIRB, 2004:61). This recommendation was heavily
influenced by the TK presented to it during the environ-
mental assessment process and by the proponent’s failure
to satisfactorily acquire and consider TK (MVEIRB, 2004).
Early in 2007, the board recommended that a small, ex-
ploratory uranium-drilling operation proposed for the
Upper Thelon basin not proceed because it would lead to
“adverse cultural impacts of a cumulative nature to areas
of very high spiritual importance to aboriginal peoples,”
noting that in reaching this conclusion “the Review Board
paid particular attention to the Elders’ traditional knowl-
edge about the Upper Thelon” (MVEIRB, 2007:4). De-
spite heavy lobbying from an outraged mining industry,
the INAC minister signed off on both recommendations,
effectively stopping both projects in their tracks. Not all
proposed projects opposed or questioned on the basis of
TK have been halted, but many have been significantly
modified in response to board directives drawing at least
in part on TK. As well, developers have adapted to the new
regulatory regime by incorporating TK into the design of
their proposals.
In short, TK is taken seriously by land-claim boards and
significantly influences their decisions and recommenda-
tions. This is noteworthy, given the conclusion of a recent
overview of the field, emphasizing practices in North
America, that “despite the growing awareness of the im-
portance for natural resource management, the current
regulations and practices in many regimes still do not
provide effective formal mechanisms of TEK into active
management” (Menzies and Butler, 2006:2).
If boards have become reasonably adept at soliciting
and using specific factual (often highly localized) ele-
ments of TK, such as community knowledge of animal
behaviour (e.g., caribou migration patterns, effects of
increase or decline of certain predators, etc.), they have
been less successful at bringing other fundamental aspects
of TK to bear on their work. The distinction drawn here is
between relying on TK in the assessment of particular
projects and bringing TK to bear on board processes and
operations. In a study of TK in land-claim boards, most
notably the MVEIRB and the Nunavut Wildlife Manage-
ment Board, I have argued that despite substantial and
sincere efforts on the boards’ part to incorporate TK into
their practices, their capacity to do so is limited by the
exigencies of the modern bureaucratic state, the central
tenets of which are in fundamental ways incompatible with
TK (White, 2006). TK encompasses far more than just
what might be termed “local environmental knowledge.”
TK entails analyses and prescriptions for all manner of
social interactions among people and between people and
animals, as well as deeply spiritual and philosophical
precepts. At a very basic level, practices such as aggres-
sive cross-examination of elders by corporate lawyers and
requirements for information brought before boards to be
made public can be directly contrary to TK principles.
More fundamentally, the cosmological elements of TK
simply represent a worldview very much at variance with
the worldview underpinning EuroCanadian governance
models, in which land-claim boards are firmly rooted.
Thus, if the measure is the extent to which land-claim
boards base decisions and recommendations on TK, sig-
nificant aboriginal influence is clearly present. However,
if the criteria include how well boards incorporate TK into
their operations and processes, the limits on aboriginal
influence are equally clear.
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CRITIQUES OF LAND-CLAIM BOARDS
Analysis of the role played, or not played, by TK in
land-claim boards offers a good entry point to the most
serious critiques of land-claim boards. For anthropologists
Paul Nadasdy and Marc Stevenson, the all-but-complete
absence of TK, in its cosmological sense, from co-man-
agement processes bespeaks fundamental problems with
the entire regime. Although their arguments apply to the
entire range of land-claim boards and they refer in passing
to environmental licensing and review boards, their analy-
ses are rooted in the experiences of wildlife co-manage-
ment boards. Much of their evidence comes from boards
that did not arise from land claims, but their critiques are
sufficiently broad as to bear directly on land-claim boards.
In his study of the Ruby Range Sheep Steering Commit-
tee, Nadasdy (2003) anchors his analysis in the develop-
ment literature and examines how language and discourse
shape perceptions and behaviour. His central conclusion:
“Without denying the sincerity of those who hope for
improved management and the empowerment of First
Nation people through co-management, we must also
acknowledge that the complex process of co-management
may have a number of other unforeseen—and unintended—
consequences.…Rather than empowering local aboriginal
communities…co-management may actually be prevent-
ing the kind of change proponents desire. Indeed, co-
management may actually be serving to extend state power
into the very communities that it is supposedly empower-
ing” (Nadasdy, 2005:216).
Nadasdy (2005) rejects what has become a standard
justification for co-management regimes: that co-
management is more effective than state management
because it can incorporate TK into decisions. He maintains
that to be of use in co-management processes, TK must be
so simplified and taken out of context that it has little value
or impact in actual decision making. However, this phase
of the analysis is brief and insufficiently developed to be
convincing. Far more compelling is his discussion of
another principal justification for co-management: that it
empowers local aboriginal people. His argument largely
rests on the proposition that “by ensnaring participants in
a tangle of bureaucracy and endless meetings” co-manage-
ment inhibits rather than fosters “meaningful change”
(Nadasdy, 2005:224). This undesired outcome occurs be-
cause, to participate effectively in co-management, abo-
riginal people have had to adopt Western bureaucratic
structures,  norms, and ways of thought: “to
participate…they have had to accept the rules and assump-
tions of the state management game” (Nadasdy, 2005:225).
The implicit but unarticulated conclusion is that by en-
meshing themselves in processes and discourses so incom-
patible with aboriginal worldviews and approaches, they
damage their culture and reduce their capacity for self-
determination. Certainly he is clear that co-management
regimes, rather than “giving aboriginal people increased
control over their lives and land might instead be seen as
subtle extensions of empire, replacing local aboriginal
ways of talking, thinking and acting with those specifi-
cally sanctioned by the state” (Nadasdy, 2005:228).
Stevenson (2006:170) accepts this logic, but is harsher
in his judgement, stating for example that the article of the
Nunavut claim establishing the Nunavut Wildlife Man-
agement Board and its objectives and processes “intro-
duces concepts so alien to traditional Inuit values and
understandings…as to be a recipe for the destruction of
Inuit culture.” Nor is he as charitable as Nadasdy, who sees
many players in the state co-management system as sin-
cere and well intentioned, but unmindful of its subtle
effects. Stevenson (2006) tends to see what he terms “the
conservation bureaucracy” as willfully dismissive of abo-
riginal people’s views and methods and unconcerned about
co-management’s deleterious effects not only for aborigi-
nal culture, but also for preserving sensitive ecosystems.
Like Nadasdy, Stevenson (2006:168, 170) maintains
that the conceptual framework of “environmental resource
management” (ERM) and the discourse it promotes “has
rendered traditional Aboriginal ways of relating to their
lands and resources virtually invisible in co-management
... whatever terminology and understandings that Aborigi-
nal participants bring to the table are quickly dismissed as
being anecdotal, unscientific or incompatible with ERM
and western law.” His overall assessment: “Aboriginal
peoples’ participation in state-sponsored projects of co-
management has served to disempower them by creating
virtually insurmountable barriers to the inclusion of their
values, understandings, knowledge and institutions into
these processes” (Stevenson, 2006:172).
In drawing our attention to the subtle yet powerful and
far-reaching implications of the ideational context of co-
management, Nadasdy and Stevenson provide valuable
insights into essential elements of land-claim boards. They
are unquestionably correct that, as Stevenson (2006:169)
puts it, “in order to advance their needs, rights and inter-
ests in co-management, aboriginal peoples have adopted
the languages, approaches and institutions of ERM and
British parliamentary law” and that, as Nadasdy (2005:225)
argues, co-management, as practiced in northern Canada
is not an “alternative to” but a “variation within” the
bureaucratic state. However, are they correct in conclud-
ing that participation in co-management arrangements is
on balance disadvantageous to aboriginal people? Do their
analyses lead to alternative proposals with a reasonable
likelihood of coming to fruition? In my view, the answer
in both cases is no.
Both Nadasdy and Stevenson rely heavily on examples
from co-management boards not based on claims. Their
arguments about the dominance of the Western bureau-
cratic paradigm are clearly applicable to land-claim boards.
However, their judgment that aboriginal insights and in-
terests are not taken seriously in board decision making
lacks sufficient empirical support to warrant accepting
that it applies to the entire range of land-claim boards. In
mandate, powers, and in other ways, land-claim boards
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differ in significant ways from boards not arising from
land claims. Moreover, as noted above, developing meas-
ures for and then carrying out a thorough, systematic
assessment of aboriginal influence on land-claim boards
would be a major undertaking. In the absence of such a
study, on the basis of a variety of formal interviews,
informal discussions, and personal observation, I am scep-
tical of sweeping generalizations that dismiss the prospect
of significant aboriginal influence on land-claim boards
from limited evidence.
Many in northern aboriginal communities (as in gov-
ernment and in non-aboriginal circles) have criticisms,
both minor and fundamental, of land-claim boards, but few
would countenance a return to the days when aboriginal
people played little if any role in wildlife and environmen-
tal decisions made by Ottawa and the territorial govern-
ments. Some evince disappointment that the claim regimes
have not lived up to their promise; others believe that, from
the outset, the compromise that the boards represent tilted
too much to government. However, few people (and none
of those interviewed for this project) dispute that aborigi-
nal influence has increased through land-claim boards.
That the compromise failed to satisfy those seeking some-
thing akin to aboriginal control of land and resources is
clear, but as Usher (1996:58) observed, “the claims agree-
ments are the results of negotiations, hence do not repre-
sent so much what the aboriginal parties sought as much as
what they (or their advisors) thought they could get gov-
ernment to agree to in the particular historical context in
which they were negotiated.” Moreover, the compromises
that aboriginal negotiators accepted did not just entail
differing visions of wildlife management. Often wildlife
management provisions were part of larger compromises
involving other components of the claim (Doubleday,
1989; Fenge, 1992).
Perhaps so, Nadasdy and Stevenson might concede, but
at what cost to aboriginal culture? This is an exceptionally
difficult question to answer, even for observers as experi-
enced and knowledgeable as Nadasdy and Stevenson.
Without denying the hegemonic power of the Western
bureaucratic paradigm, we should not underestimate the
resilience of aboriginal cultures or their adaptability. Con-
sider, for example, how modern communication technolo-
gies at once threaten aboriginal cultures and are used to
foster them. Does learning the rules of the co-management
game, developing bureaucratic expertise and engaging in
the discourse of state management necessarily entail a loss
of culture for aboriginal people? Aboriginal cultures are
not static and have repeatedly demonstrated remarkable
capacity to retain their central defining values in the face
of changing circumstances. This observation is not to
downplay the threats to aboriginal cultures from a host of
developments, including loss of language and severing of
links to the land, but rather to suggest that the health of
aboriginal cultures is a complex matter.
As well, we must be careful about reading too much into
the language of land-claim boards, symbolically important
as language may be. By way of illustration, Stevenson
(2006) and others (e.g., Spak, 2005) accord considerable
weight to the observation that the very notion of “manag-
ing” wildlife is inconceivable and absurd in traditional
northern aboriginal cultures. True enough, but as Natcher
et al. (2005:241) noted, “co-management has more to do
with managing human relationships than resources per
se.” An aboriginal member of a wildlife management
board put it this way: “We want to manage people, not fish
and wildlife.”
Finally, what alternatives do the critics proffer from
their pessimistic analyses of co-management? Nadasdy
(2003:145) proposes “the devolution of control over local
land and resources to aboriginal communities themselves
and this would have to include not only control over
wildlife but also over all forms of development.” As he
recognizes, this devolution would entail “a radical re-
thinking of the basic assumptions, values, and practices
underlying contemporary processes of resource manage-
ment and environmental impact assessment” (Nadasdy,
2003:145), though precisely how this would come to be is
vague. In response, Hunn et al. (2003:S80) observe:
His “solution” imagines a world in which colonial
occupation and settlement never occurred and nations
willingly concede their sovereign power. In reality,
indigenous communities must necessarily engage an
encompassing polity that holds ultimate power. It would
seem more in the interest of the survival of indigenous
communities to foster a dialogue, however imperfect,
with the professional scientists and resource managers
entrusted by national governments with the “protection
of our natural resources.”
In a later publication, Nadasdy (2005:228) does not go
beyond the admonition “that anthropologists and other
scholars critically examine their own involvement in proc-
esses of knowledge-integration and co-management.” This
is sound advice, but hardly a blueprint for significant
structural change.
Stevenson (2006) proposes an approach based on the
“two-row wampum,” a symbol of two canoes travelling
parallel paths in peace and friendship, which would create
space for aboriginal people and their modes of thought and
knowledge systems in co-management processes. This
proposal would be effected primarily through better edu-
cation for non-aboriginal resource managers “to develop a
new professional literacy that equips them with an under-
standing about how resource management decisions re-
flect and affect the social, cultural and political settings in
which they live and work” (Stevenson, 2006:176).
Stevenson’s proposal would not be an easy undertaking
but would doubtless have salutary effects on the culture,
operations, and decision making of land-claim boards.
However, it would not fundamentally change the institu-
tional framework within which the boards operate; boards
would remain firmly established as part of the bureaucratic
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state system (with ministerial override provisions firmly
in place). As Usher (2003:379) noted, co-management is
“the antithesis of the parallel canoe approach.” Stevenson’s
idea is worthwhile, but falls far short of radical restructur-
ing of the land-claim board regimes, let alone their re-
placement with something that would return land and
wildlife decisions to aboriginal peoples.
Nadasdy and Stevenson both focus their critiques on
wildlife management boards and have little to say about
other types of land-claim boards, most notably those
engaged in environmental regulation. Wildlife manage-
ment regimes controlled by aboriginal people, and run on
the basis of thoroughgoing TK principles and aboriginal
cultural mores, with minimal state influence, are certainly
conceivable. Such principles and mores can be—and in-
deed are—incorporated to some extent into regulatory
processes for assessing and mitigating the environmental
impact of major infrastructure and economic development
projects such as mines, pipelines, dams, and roads (as well
as processes for approving or rejecting them). However, it
is difficult to imagine such a regime outside the realm of
state processes and conceptual frameworks. The state
simply has too extensive an interest in major projects to
forgo deep involvement in regulating them. And of course,
the power imbalance between aboriginal communities and
governments on the one hand and the state on the other
heavily favours the state. Nor is there anything like an
analogue in traditional aboriginal experience for regulat-
ing large-scale resource extraction projects, as there is for
wildlife management. Otherwise put, it seems inevitable
that environmental regulation will proceed along state-
sanctioned lines, with considerable scope for aboriginal
influence, but not complete control. In turn, this suggests
that the possibility of the state’s “devolving control over
local land and resources to Aboriginal communities [in-
cluding] all forms of development” (Nadasdy, 2003:145)
is remote.
Political scientists employ the concept of “path de-
pendence” to explain government policy and develop-
ment of state structures (Pierson, 2004). In this schema,
choices and decisions at key historical junctures condi-
tion and constrain subsequent policy choices and institu-
tional developments. It is not a determinist interpretation,
but it does alert us to the weight of past decisions. And
weighty decisions on the part of both the state and
aboriginal peoples to enter into comprehensive land-
claim agreements (and, inter alia, to accept the boards
created under those claims) powerfully condition abo-
riginal-state relations. Governments, believing claims to
be “final” and “settled,” are unlikely to welcome at-
tempts to renegotiate critical land and resource provi-
sions. For their part, aboriginal governments and political
organizations with settled claims are concerned prima-
rily with ensuring that the state lives up to its commit-
ments in terms of properly implementing their claims and
are equally unlikely to initiate attempts at sweeping
renegotiation. While they sometimes disagree vigorously
with the policies and decisions of federal and territorial
governments, northern aboriginal governments and po-
litical organizations have become highly institutional-
ized and in certain ways have become enmeshed in, or
adjuncts of, the state. (An important example is the
aboriginal groups’ nomination or appointment of land-
claim board members, with the patronage possibilities
this entails.) Thus, in the absence of clearly articulated
strategies for replacing the land-claim board regimes,
which neither Nasasdy nor Stevenson offers, no serious
alternative to these boards seems likely to emerge for
some considerable time.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the evidence, although fragmentary, impres-
sionistic, and sometimes decidedly equivocal, supports
the proposition that aboriginal peoples can and do wield
significant influence over land and wildlife decisions
through the boards established under the northern compre-
hensive land claims. Land-claim boards exercise substan-
tial power over land and resource decisions, their apparently
limited authority notwithstanding. A high proportion of
board members are aboriginal, and their direct influence
on board decisions is substantial. Boards and board mem-
bers enjoy extensive independence in their operations and
in their decision making, although important constraints
on their independence, most notably through Ottawa’s
appointment prerogative and its funding processes, are
evident. TK plays an important role in land-claim board
decisions (both wildlife management and environmental
regulation); however, although boards have sincerely tried
to incorporate TK into all phases of their work, the boards’
essentially bureaucratic nature means that these attempts
have been only partially successful.
Criticisms of individual boards and the entire board
regime abound, but no one proposes a return to the days
when aboriginal people were effectively excluded from
land and resource decisions made by the federal govern-
ment. Agreement is all but universal that the land-claim
boards offer aboriginal people substantially greater influ-
ence over government decisions affecting the land and
wildlife than was possible, or even imaginable, under the
state system. To be sure, sophisticated critiques have been
mounted on land-claim (and other) boards as agents of
cultural assimilation, but the critics do not offer much
guidance as to how a far-reaching restructuring of the
boards and their role within the Canadian state, or their
wholesale replacement by a fundamentally different re-
gime, might come about. Current political configurations
suggest that the prospects for a resource management re-
gime characterized by genuine aboriginal control displac-
ing the land-claim boards in the foreseeable future are slim.
Thus if “the alternative” is the state management sys-
tem that largely excluded aboriginal people and their TK,
land-claim boards may be judged a success in securing
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aboriginal influence over important land and wildlife de-
cisions. Yet other alternatives that go beyond a vaguely
defined ideal regime (“the Almighty”) do exist. Feit’s
assessment that the way forward “must include the contin-
ued development of forms of self-management as well as
improved forms of state-level wildlife management…
[since] in a real and practical sense they are now insepara-
bly interlinked, and in many ways they are necessary to
each other” is no less valid today than when it was written
in the late 1980s, though it is well to recall an important
question he poses: “whether co-management will in the
long term come to constitute a form of co-optation and
domination, which will weaken self-management and self-
governance” (Feit, 1988:84 – 85).
Land-claim boards and the role they play in northern
governance continue to evolve, and it is an open question
whether, in terms of aboriginal influence, change will
represent progress or regress. This paper has demon-
strated, however, that to this point the overall record of
land-claim boards is positive in promoting and protecting
aboriginal interests and worldviews in government poli-
cies and decisions relating to wildlife and environmental
regulation.
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